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FOREIGN ENTRY STRATEGIES: STRATEGIC ADAPTATION TO VARIOUS 
FACETS OF THE INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper we develop a comprehensive model of MNEs' foreign entry 
strategies and theorize how and how much the entry strategy is likely to be 
determined in the interface between internal and external pressures for both 
conformity and legitimacy. We develop an adaptation argument, in contrast to 
a selection rationale, through which we enhance our understanding of the 
various facets of the institutional environment and the constraints 
international managers encounter in their internationalization strategies.  
 
Keywords: foreign entry strategies, adaptation, multinational firms, 
institutional environments 
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite abundant research on entry strategies in International Business (IB) 
studies, scholars have paid scant attention to the social context within which 
entry strategies into foreign markets are embedded (Granovetter, 1985). In 
fact, few studies have contrasted economic and social explanations for entry 
mode strategy choices. For example, it is unclear how different entry mode 
strategies reflect the internal, inter-firm, and external environment pressures. 
It is accepted, however, that the models of interaction between firms and their 
institutional environments determine firms' adjustment to external constraints 
and may promote firms' survival, even if the external environments are 
unknown and cannot be accurately predicted. In the case of multinational 
enterprises (MNEs), the difficulties are heightened because MNEs are exposed 
to multiple and distinctly complex foreign business environments (Guisinger, 
2001). Guisinger (2000), for example, suggested that the essence of 
International Business (IB) is the adaptations that firms must undertake when 
they face unfamiliar, unstable, and complex surroundings in foreign countries. 
But how do MNEs adapt? To adapt, survive, and grow, MNEs need to respond 
effectively to internal institutional pressures as well as to the demands 
imposed by external environments (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Kostova & Roth, 
2002; Scott, 2003). Hence, each subsidiary must strategically adapt to the 
various dimensions of the host country's institutional environment (e.g., 
regulatory, legal, economic, technological, cultural), to the patterns of inter-
firm interaction (e.g., industry regulations, cultural norms, anti-trust laws, 
industry associations) as well as to MNEs' internal norms. As noted by Oliver 
(1997: 697): 
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Firm's institutional environment includes its internal culture as well as 
broader influences from the state, society, and interfirm relations that 
define socially acceptable economic behavior. 
In this paper we assess the impact of the multiple facets of MNEs' 
institutional environments (i.e., internal and external) on the selection of 
foreign entry strategies (see also Davis, Desai & Francis, 2000). We 
follow recent research suggesting that firms make choices that are 
influenced by their environments (see also D'Aunno, Sutton & Price, 
1991), including other firms operating in the same industry or in the 
same host market; firms then formulate a strategic response to their 
environmental conditions (Oliver, 1991). When analyzing external 
institutional pressures we distinguish two contexts - i.e., home and host 
country, and inter-firm interfaces. External institutional pressures include 
regulatory structures, governmental agencies, laws, courts, professions, 
interest groups, public opinion (Scott, 2003), culture, and economy. Each 
new subsidiary's set of rules, procedures, practices, norms, values, and 
structures require legitimacy in light of the host country’s institutional 
environment. Inter-firm interfaces represent practices of rivalry and 
imitation whereby firms choose to follow strategies implemented by other 
firms. Internal institutional pressures apply to the analysis of MNEs' 
subsidiaries, and refer to conformity pressures from headquarters and 
other subsidiaries. For example, the structure and internal processes of a 
new subsidiary need to adapted, or already be similar, to those of other 
subsidiaries of the same parent MNE in order for the new subsidiary to be 
considered a complete member of the corporation. The sense of 
membership, or identification, is fundamental if the new subsidiary is to 
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receive resource inflows from its sisters and headquarters. Therefore, we 
develop an adaptation, rather than a selection, argument of MNEs' 
adjustment to the foreign institutional environments to analyze MNEs 
foreign entry strategy. While traditional selection arguments leave few 
possibilities for firms' strategic choices, a strategic adaptation rationale is 
based on how these choices permit overcoming an otherwise overly 
restrictive and limiting environment. 
Furthermore, although we take a strategic perspective, we also 
acknowledge that strategy is formulated within agents' bounded rationality 
(Simon, 1957), decision-making, and the direct influence of surrounding 
agents [i.e., their actions, beliefs, and whom they use as referent others 
(Shah, 1998)]. Therefore, firms may seldom commit to a definite profit 
maximizing strategy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Norman, 1988). That is, 
efficiency rationale or profit maximizing strategic choices may be disregarded 
in some cases; instead, MNEs may actually be constrained to choose among a 
more limited set of alternatives than we often realize. By simultaneously 
examining firms' entry strategies with both institutional and economic lenses, 
we can better analyze the effects of both ex ante and ex post institutional 
forces upon MNEs' entry strategies. 
Our study contributes to current research by presenting a more 
comprehensive and multi-dimensional approach to firms' strategic adaptation 
to internal and external pressures, in contrast to existing studies that present 
too much of a piecemeal approach to be illustrative of the complexity involved. 
By recognizing that varied facets of the institutional environment affect MNEs' 
decisions differently, we offer a more in-depth analysis of each dimension. 
Furthermore, in line with recent research (e.g., Xu & Shenkar, 2002), we posit 
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that institutional distance (Kostova, 1999; Kostova & Zaheer, 1999) between 
home and host countries matters, but possibly more important is the direction 
of this distance. We suggest, for example, that institutional distance is better 
conceptualized by considering the pool of prior foreign experiences of the 
MNEs, rather than merely the difference between home and host countries. 
Furthermore, while the extant research assumes the existence of a "model" for 
firms to imitate, we propose that referent models do not always exist; rather, 
firms are forced to rank order other market players in search of strategies to 
follow. 
We first briefly summarize current research on foreign market entry 
strategies. In the second section, we review institutional theory as the 
theoretical foundation for our arguments. In the third section we develop 
propositions to address MNEs' entry strategies into foreign countries and 
explore the evolution of MNEs' responses to their environments, in an effort to 
uncover the rationale behind managers’ choices of entry strategies. We also 
advance the moderating effects of MNEs' international experiences and 
technological strategies. We conclude with a discussion of much warranted 
future research.  
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES' FOREIGN ENTRY STRATEGIES 
Foreign entry strategies have been extensively studied in IB research. 
Some studies have focused on the antecedents or predictors of entry mode 
choice, others on the specific factors that lead to equity investment as the 
preferred mode of entry, and yet others on the consequences of entry modes 
(see Werner, 2002). Given the focus of this paper, this section describes 
succinctly the main approaches to explain the antecedents of foreign entry 
strategies. We classify existing research on the antecedents of foreign entry 
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strategies in three main approaches. First, earlier studies on 
internationalization emphasize the effects of international experience 
accumulation on the selection of investment location and entry mode 
(Johanson & Wiedershiem-Paul, 1975; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977, 1990; 
Cagusvil, 1980; Luostarinen & Welch, 1990; Root, 1994). These studies 
suggest an evolutionary, sequential, and largely deterministic model of 
internationalization that evolves with knowledge acquisition, risk perception, 
commitment of resources, and accumulation of international experience. These 
studies further prescribe that entry strategies follow a pattern of increasing 
involvement in foreign operations, from low involvement entry strategies 
(e.g., exports) to higher commitment strategies (e.g., foreign direct 
investment through greenfield investments and/or acquisitions).  
Second, foreign entry strategies have been studied as the outcome of 
the internalization of market imperfections and the minimization of transaction 
costs by organizing exchanges within the MNE (Williamson, 1975, 1991; 
Rugman, 1981; Hennart, 1982; Dunning, 1988). According to these studies, 
the best foreign entry strategy minimizes transaction and production costs and 
overcomes market imperfections (Teece, 1986). The higher the market 
imperfection (e.g., imperfections in the market for knowledge) the more likely 
the MNE will internalize those markets and adopt, for example, greenfield 
entry strategies (Dunning, 1988).  
Finally, a third approach to foreign entry strategies is rooted in a social 
network perspective. The network model of foreign entry strategy suggests 
that MNEs integrating networks with buyers, suppliers, and competitors have 
privileged access to markets (Johanson & Mattson, 1988; Ellis, 2000). 
Cooperating with other firms facilitates market entry, reduces risks and costs, 
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and attenuates political and cultural constraints (Stinchcombe, 1965; Hannan 
& Freeman, 1989; Henisz, 2000).  
These studies lay out the now well-understood main benefits and 
drawbacks of each entry strategy [see Root (1994) for an extensive review of 
entry strategies]. The different entry strategies are: exports, contractual 
agreements (such as licensing agreements), equity joint ventures, partial and 
wholly owned foreign acquisitions, and greenfield startup investments. Non-
equity-based entry strategies offer better protection against country risks and 
transactional hazards than equity-based strategies (Osland & Cavusgil, 1996), 
but non-equity strategies, such as export and contractual agreements, enable 
less organizational learning. In fact, low commitment entry strategies may be 
preferred to overcome unfamiliarity with the host country environment 
(Barkema, Bell & Pennings, 1996). For example, the establishment of a 
subsidiary through the acquisition of a local firm permits fast access to foreign 
firms' knowledge (e.g., market or technological knowledge), and access to an 
already established market position. An acquisition also provides some degree 
of immediate embeddedness and allows the firm to enter a network of ties to 
suppliers, clients and agents in the host country. Joint ventures have also 
been noted as vehicles for learning since cooperation with a local partner 
provides the focal firm an opportunity to utilize the partner's local market 
knowledge (Tallman & Fladmoe-Lindquist, 2002) and social and business ties. 
In addition, joint ventures allow technological advancement through the 
transfer of technologies among partners. In contrast, contractual agreements 
(i.e., licensing, R&D contracts, alliances, etc.) often involve explicit 
descriptions of technologies intended to be learned by one party. Finally, a 
greenfield entry strategy essentially consists of the replication in a foreign 
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target of home country operations. This strategy is based on full control over 
the foreign subsidiaries and pretty much an ethnocentric orientation whereby 
directives emanate from corporate headquarters. While this strategy is 
appropriate when seeking to protect proprietary resources and technologies it 
is also the one that imposes higher degrees of "foreignness" in the host 
market.  
We analyze which alternative entry strategy the MNE is more likely to 
select as a function of institutional dimensions. The entry strategy decision is 
important due to the commitment of resources it entails (Agarwal & 
Ramaswamy, 1991), and the assumption of risk and readiness for political 
(Henisz, 2000), social, and cultural (Hofstede, 1980) challenges the firm will 
encounter. The entry strategy is also important because it represents the first 
interface for a strategic adaptation to both internal corporate conditions and to 
host country conditions. 
MNEs' INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENTS 
Institutional theory typically focuses on the pressures exerted by 
external institutions on firms' strategies. External institutions may consist of 
regulatory structures, agencies, laws, courts, professions, interest groups, and 
public opinion (Oliver, 1991). To build legitimacy, organizations must comply 
with formal and informal rules, norms, behaviors, and ceremonies set forth by 
external institutions in the places where they operate (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; 
DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991; Kanter, 1997; Kostova & Zaheer, 
1999). Hence, institutional theorists emphasizing the value of conformity to 
the external environment suggest that to survive and prosper, firms need to 
be similar, or isomorphic, to their environment and surrounding agents (Meyer 
& Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Isomorphism through mimicry is a 
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strategic choice whereby one firm in a population enhances its legitimacy 
(Suchman, 1995; Dacin, 1997), by resembling other incumbent firms facing 
the same set of environmental conditions (Hawley, 1968; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  In fact, recent research primarily highlights 
legitimacy arguments and mimicking effects, with the latter operationalized as 
imitation of incumbent firms or market leaders (Haveman, 1993; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). This argument is consistent with a growing body of IB research 
suggesting the efficacy of adaptation and responsiveness to the local market. 
Firms seek compliance, or adaptation, to the foreign business environment, 
not necessarily for efficiency, but rather to conform to the "taken-for-granted 
assumptions about what constitutes appropriate or acceptable economic 
behavior" (Oliver, 1997: 699). Similarly, MNEs may follow certain foreign 
entry strategies not because they are the most efficient or economically 
rational choices but due to host environment requirements (Oliver, 1997) that 
are socially obligatory (Zukin & DiMaggio, 1990). Alternatively, MNEs may 
mimic entry strategies chosen by leader firms, firms in the same industry, 
firms of similar size, or firms that appear particularly successful (Haveman, 
1993). Hence, it is also important to observe competitors' foreign entry 
strategies to understand the strategies of individual firms.  
Institutional pressures are not deterministic. Firms' strategies reflect the 
ability to respond, change, and influence (Oliver, 1991). While institutional 
theory has traditionally embodied the deterministic effect of institutional rules, 
ceremonies, myths, and beliefs on how organizations become instilled with 
value and social meaning, Oliver (1991) argues that firms develop through 
their strategic responses to institutional pressures. This view parallels Nelson 
and Winter's (1982) argument of intended strategy, which conceptualizes 
 - 9 - 
firms as active agents with the ability to mold their environment. The notion of 
intended strategy further claims  that firms' strategies actually shape the 
model of adaptation to foreign environments, from which we infer that firms 
are not imprisoned in an isomorphic determinism (Oliver, 1991, 1997).  
Firms adapt to the institutional environment through choosing a foreign 
entry strategy and a location. For example, Westney (1993:71) notes that 
"location is a key variable: Japanese firms tend to locate their plants in areas 
where the institutionalization of U.S. auto industry pattern is weak or non-
existent." According to Westney these are areas where unionization is low, the 
labor force is unaccustomed to assembly line work, or high unemployment 
from plant closures de-institutionalized existing patterns (see also Shaver, 
1998).  Thus, in the case of the auto industry, adaptation is reflected in the 
selection of equity entry strategy and low institutionalized locations. 
Foreign entry strategies face dual and potentially conflicting pressures 
toward compliance to internal norms (corporate normative) and toward 
adaptation to local environmental requirements (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). 
The term “institutional duality” refers to two distinct sets of isomorphic 
pressures originating from the host country network and from the internal 
MNE network, and the corresponding need for foreign subsidiaries to hold 
legitimacy within both networks (Kostova & Roth, 2002). Internal pressures 
push the new foreign entry and the new subsidiary to resemble prior entries 
and/or other subsidiaries' structures and internal processes. This similarity will 
be crucial for resource transfers among subsidiaries. Internal pressures may 
include hiring expatriates, importing intermediate products instead of 
acquiring them locally, and partnering with host banks rather than home 
financial service firms. That is, internal pressures rest on taken-for-granted 
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assumptions embedded in the firm's operations, which result from past 
experiences, power relations, inertia, common beliefs, and memories. 
Conversely, external pressures are embodied in formal, informal, and, to a 
great extent, in locally enacted norms of what is "right" and "wrong." For 
example, a firm may prefer establishing a subsidiary if the host country’s 
citizens are averse to foreign firms (Root, 1994). Thus, a foreign entry 
strategy is legitimate insofar as it is perceived by relevant actors in the home 
or host environment as the "natural way" to enter. To some extent, by seeking 
local legitimacy, MNEs reduce a possible negative impact of foreignness 
(Hymer, 1976; Zaheer, 1995). 
In sum, the basic idea of institutional theory is that firms tend to 
conform to the local prevailing "ways of doing things," organizing and 
behaving. These are based on social expectations and influences by which 
firms should abide to gain legitimacy and improve their capacity to survive and 
prosper. In contrast, strategic and international management theories seek to 
discover strategies that are most efficient for the firm, given internal and 
external constraints and objectives. Mere conformity to internal and external 
social pressures is in relative contrast to the optimization of firms' strategic 
choices. 
STRATEGIC ADAPTATION TO VARIOUS FACETS OF INSTITUTIONAL 
ENVIRONMENTS 
Although many studies have analyzed MNEs' foreign entry strategies, 
only a few have considered both economic factors and social contexts 
(Granovetter, 1985) to explain entry strategy choices. In Figure 1, we 
illustrate different facets of institutional environments and their impacts on 
entry strategy choices. In this section, we do not attempt to provide an entire 
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repertoire of firms' strategic choices, but rather to highlight the dynamics 
involved when considering each institutional facet. First, while previous 
research has mainly focused on a simple government-level induced institution 
(Henisz, 2000, 2003), we consider more detailed macro-institutional factors of 
the home and host markets’ environments as composed of social/cultural, 
political, legal/regulatory, economic, and technological dimensions. These 
dimensions interact among themselves and exist in both the home and host 
markets. Second, we see internal organizational pressures as important 
factors determining the entry strategy. Internal factors include the norms, 
values, power and politics, organizational culture, path dependent history and 
tradition, competencies, and resources of the firm (Nelson & Winter, 1982; 
Barney, 1991). Third, we stress inter-firm relationships. These are 
relationships with other home-, host-, or third-country firms (represented by 
the three circles on the right in Figure 1). 
 [Insert Figure 1 about here]  
Given that MNEs are embedded in a system of inter-related economic 
and institutional pressures at different levels, it is not likely that any of these 
pressures will operate in isolation, nor that one will dominate MNEs' strategic 
choices (Granovetter, 1985; Dacin, 1997). In the following sections we explore 
how these different dimensions of an MNE's institutional environment may 
affect strategic choices regarding the selection of foreign market entry 
strategies. The major propositions advanced in this paper are illustrated in 
Figure 2. 
[Insert Figure 2 about here] 
The Institutional Environment of the Host Country & Foreign Entry 
Strategies 
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The characteristics of the institutional environment of the host country 
affect MNEs' entry strategies. A host country's institutional environment is 
composed of rules, norms, and traditions, some of which are explicitly stated 
or recorded, while others are not (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). In a well-developed 
institutional environment, collective sanctions exerted upon norm-violators are 
severe because the norms are widely accepted and there are effective 
institutions that either prevent violations or coercively enforce the prevailing 
norms. Such institutions are necessary for forming successful strategic 
alliances and joint ventures. Therefore, when the host country encompasses 
well-developed institutions that guarantee the enforceability of contracts and 
reduce transaction hazards and opportunism (Williamson, 1985; Meyer, 2001; 
Henisz, 2000), the MNE is more likely to favor collaborative entry strategies 
such as strategic alliances and joint ventures. Acquiring better knowledge 
about the local institutional environment can be realized by finding a local 
partner (e.g., constituting a joint venture with local partners) and/or by 
transforming local firms into subsidiaries (i.e., by acquiring an incumbent 
firm). Entering well-institutionalized markets through partnerships allows the 
MNE to establish bonds with local agents familiar with local norms, thus 
increasing the subsidiary's survival prospects. Similarly, an acquisition involves 
acquiring a firm already embedded in the market and already holding social 
and business ties to surrounding agents. Conversely, both exports and 
greenfield investment entry strategies involve bringing "foreignness" into the 
market, and are more likely to face opposition. 
This assertion is interesting for IB research because it entails a 
significant contrast with the prevailing view of partnerships as inter-
organizational models for sharing the hazards associated with unstable and 
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high-risk countries (Henisz, 2000). However, it is consistent with the growth of 
alliances in Western countries (Dunning, 1995; UNCTAD, 2001), because 
Western countries are, predictably, more and better institutionalized than less 
developed countries. Hence, other variables held constant, MNEs are more 
likely to select collaborative entry strategies when the host market is highly 
institutionalized. 
Proposition 1a.  MNEs entering highly institutionalized foreign countries are 
more likely to select joint ventures and acquisitions entry strategies as 
opposed to export or greenfield entries.  
Decomposing the impact of the host country’s institutional environment 
on entry strategies into normative, cognitive and regulative dimensions (e.g., 
Xu & Shenkar, 2002), we may expect that each dimension exerts an 
idiosyncratic influence on MNEs' entry strategies. The regulative aspects of 
institutional environments, such as rules and regulations, are clearly 
articulated and can be observed and followed; thus, gaining legitimacy is 
relatively straightforward, particularly in the presence of an effective 
regulatory environment. However, the normative and cognitive aspects of 
institutional environments, such as informal norms and standards, are 
considerably less perceptible to outsiders, and hence prove to be a more 
difficult adaptation. For instance, the importance of understanding cognitive 
norms and cultural idiosyncrasies is often highlighted in tips for "doing 
business" in Asian countries. In these countries the informal norms of gift 
offerings, hierarchies and an array of complex traditions are difficult for 
foreigners to grasp. Also, in Italy, particularly in the south, the "men of honor" 
tradition and complex social interactions among "families" demonstrate how 
informal norms construct the social structure of interactions that is challenging 
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for foreign firms to comprehend. Informal norms are unwritten, are tacit, and 
contrast sharply with formal norms, imposed by the legal and judicial systems. 
In other instances, the sheer complexity of the governmental apparatus, such 
as the legal and judicial systems, increases the cognitive difficulties of 
operating in a foreign country. Notwithstanding, a violation of cognitive and/or 
normative norms may lead to results as fatal as the violation of legal rules (Xu 
& Shenkar, 2002). Hence, MNEs are more likely to rely on local partners to 
learn and incorporate these invisible rules.  
The differentiation we build is between cognitive and normative 
dimensions on the one hand, and the regulative dimension on the other. While 
the first are implicit, largely tacit and difficult to codify and learn, the second 
involves explicit norms and regulations that firms must honor. Therefore, it is 
more necessary for MNEs to rely on local partners or collaborators to 
understand cognitive and normative dimensions than to understand the 
actions and implications of regulatory institutions. 
Proposition 1b. MNEs entering normatively and cognitively institutionalized 
foreign countries are more likely to select collaborative entry strategies such 
as joint ventures than when entering regulatively institutionalized foreign 
countries. 
Institutional Distance between Home and Host Countries & Foreign 
Entry Strategies 
Another major driver of entry strategy selection is the perceived 
institutional difference between host and home country (Kostova, 1999) or 
between prior entries and the prospective host country (Johanson & 
Wiedershiem-Paul, 1975). Institutional distance hinders the flow of information 
between the MNE and the market (Xu & Shenkar, 2002) and may promote the 
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adoption of strategies that are not more efficient but rather more legitimate. 
For example, if the prospective host country's environment is perceived to be 
substantially institutionally different from the MNEs' home institutional 
environments or prior entry experiences in other foreign countries, the MNEs 
may prefer to commit fewer resources to its operations in the foreign country. 
Therefore, when entering countries with high institutional distance from the 
home country or previous experiences, MNEs may select non-equity, and low 
involvement, entry strategies. The more institutionally distant the host country 
is, the higher the degree of adaptation needed by MNEs. This is because a 
larger institutional distance between home and host country requires the need 
to evaluate, learn and adapt more extensively to local institutional agents and 
norms. For example, in earlier stages of internationalization, the use of export 
entry strategy may be appropriate because it favors low risk and low 
commitment of resources while it allows a period of learning about the host's 
institutional environment. Partial evidence of this effect was uncovered by Li 
and Guisinger's (1991) study of failures of foreign-controlled firms in the U.S. 
and their finding that higher failure rates occurred for firms from culturally 
dissimilar countries. To the extent that the "license to operate" (Kanter, 1997) 
requires cooperation with local partners, the MNE may choose non-equity 
strategies (e.g., exports, licensing) or partnerships (e.g., joint ventures) with 
local partners.  
Proposition 2a.  MNEs entering institutionally distant markets are more likely 
to select exports or partnership (joint ventures and partial acquisitions) entry 
strategies, and less likely to choose greenfield startup investments.  
In addition to institutional distance between home and host, one must 
consider differences in how the distance is structured (Shenkar, 2001; Xu & 
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Shenkar, 2002). We delineate two basic scenarios for the same institutional 
distance between two countries (a home and a host country) with 
asymmetrical effects: (1) the home country has a more developed institutional 
environment than the host country, or (2) the home country has a more 
immature institutional market environment than the host country. The effects 
are not likely to be equivalent for an MNE from a home country with well 
developed institutions entering a host country with poorly developed 
institutions, and vice versa (Xu & Shenkar, 2002).  
Partnership and networking resources of various kinds are less 
important for entering institutionally mature countries, such as those of the 
European Union or the U.S. because these countries already have well 
established institutions that facilitate internationalization (Henisz, 2000). 
Developed countries possess well-structured, highly specialized and effective 
institutions, which smooth the process of MNEs' entry. In addition, because 
these countries have more sophisticated markets and more developed firms 
(both domestic and subsidiaries of foreign MNEs), it is likely that foreign firms 
entering these countries will base their advantage in some form of intangible 
resource (e.g., knowledge) or capability (Kogut & Zander, 1992; Dunning, 
1998). Thus, it is important for MNEs to internally guard their firm-specific 
advantage(s) to compete in the host country. As a result, these MNEs are 
more likely to prefer wholly-owned subsidiaries to protect their advantages 
(Buckley & Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1998). In contrast, when MNEs enter an 
institutionally primitive market from an institutionally mature market, they are 
more likely to select collaborative entry strategies to uncover the possible 
hazards of embedded rules and hidden norms (Johanson & Mattson, 1988; 
Chen & Chen, 1998).  
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Proposition 2b.  MNEs from institutionally mature countries entering 
institutionally primitive countries are more likely to select joint ventures or 
acquisitions of local firms as entry strategies.   
Proposition 2c.  MNEs from institutionally primitive countries entering 
institutionally developed countries are more likely to select greenfield entry 
strategies.   
Inter-firm Interfaces  
Organizational ecologists argue that "structural inertia" is an obstacle to 
flexibility and limits firms' ability to adapt to external pressures (e.g., Hannan 
& Freeman, 1984; Scott, 2003). Inertia hinders change and favors the 
replication of past actions, strategies, and behaviors. This suggests that 
internal (inertial) pressures affect the entry strategy choices of MNEs and 
encourage them not to break away from known, accepted, and experienced 
practices. MNEs are likely to replicate organizational structures and foreign 
entry strategies with which they are familiar--that is, entry strategies utilized 
in prior entries (Tallman, 1991). 
Given such inertial pressures, how do MNEs select entry strategies that 
appear to increase their likelihood of success? The imitation of incumbent 
firms is a form of mimetic isomorphism (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Haveman, 1993) that increases the legitimacy of MNEs’ 
operations in the host country, and promotes easier access to resources. A 
mimicking strategy is particularly effective for MNEs entering an unfamiliar 
host country for the first time. However, the primary question is which 
referent(s) firm(s) should be imitated. If there are other MNEs from the same 
home country already operating in the host country and these MNEs appear to 
be successful, then it is likely these are good referents to imitate. This is 
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because these MNEs come from a similar (not identical) institutional 
environment and appear to have successfully adjusted to the host market. As 
Carroll (1993: 246) stated: 
At some point the evolutionary process likely becomes calculative in 
that successful firms are readily recognizable and managers can formulate 
pretty good guesses as to what equilibrium criterion is being favored and 
the organizational factors that might produce it. 
In the absence of home country models, the referent others (Shah, 
1998) are  other foreign firms from a third country, firms in the same 
industry, or firms of similar size, that appear to be particularly successful 
(Haveman, 1993). It is worth noting that host country firms can hardly be 
considered as referents for foreign entry strategies because they are not 
involved in entering their own home country. However, host country firms may 
be utilized to evaluate the appropriate configuration and composition of 
network of ties needed in the host country, as well as other formal 
characteristics (e.g., organizational structures) - all of which are to some 
extent post-entry decisions. We suggest that in the absence of home country 
referents, firms from a third country are more likely to be used as referent 
firms. However, mimicking third-country firms is difficult because they are 
embedded in a different home social context (Granovetter, 1985) and there 
may be significant ambiguity (Reed & DeFillipi, 1990) in detecting what these 
referent firms really do. Nevertheless, third-country firms may still provide 
valuable insights into how to respond to the host institutional environment.  
Proposition 3. MNEs' foreign entry strategies are more likely to resemble 
those of competing successful firms, such that MNEs will mimic other home 
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country MNEs, and in the absence of home country referent firms MNEs will 
mimic successful third-country MNEs operating in the host country.  
MNE's Internal Institutional Environment 
Foreign entry strategies are also determined by the degree of 
conformity to internal pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 
1977; Oliver, 1997; Kostova, 1999; Xu & Shenkar, 2002). Internal pressures 
include existing organizational structures, corporate mission, vision, and goals 
of the MNE, norms and values, management and dominant coalitions, and 
organizational culture (see figure 1). For example, MNEs favoring a high 
degree of control and coordination of subsidiaries are more likely to favor 
wholly-owned strategies over other foreign entry strategies (Davis et al., 
2000) as means of parental isomorphism, to better override internal 
disruptions and inefficiencies. Tallman and Yip (2000) argued that absolute 
adaptation to the host country would reduce the MNE "to a loose collection of 
autonomous businesses that enjoy little synergy while incurring the overheads 
of a large MNE." Specifically, we may expect the acquisition of existing firms to 
be more likely to cause disruptions in the overall organization's stability and 
dominant culture (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986). Conversely, greenfield startup 
entry strategy permits fuller replication of internal structures and normative 
values, with less internal disruption.  
Relatively small investments in foreign market entry are less likely to 
have a major internal impact on the firm and hence may be more easily 
realized through greenfield investments as opposed to the acquisition of a 
local firm. On the contrary, collaborative entry strategies are more likely to 
introduce internal disruptions because the participation in equity joint ventures 
or alliances imposes increased coordination, control, and management 
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demands. Partnership entry strategies permit not only a better fit with existing 
host institutional pressures, than, for example, greenfield entries, they also 
offer partial control over the subsidiary's operations, and provide the 
subsidiary with autonomy for local action. Greenfield subsidiaries allow an MNE 
to maintain full control over its foreign operations, but may be less responsive 
to host institutional pressures: "as parents exercise increasing control, 
pressures to maintain internal isomorphism may override pressures for 
isomorphism in the external environment" (Davis et al., 2000: 243). Hence, 
MNEs are more likely to select exports or greenfield entry strategies to 
minimize internal disruptions. Conversely, MNEs are more likely to utilize 
acquisition of incumbent firms or entering into international alliances when 
internal pressures toward conformity are less salient.  
Proposition 4a.  MNEs are more likely to select joint ventures and acquisition 
entry strategies when organizational internal isomorphic pressures are lower, 
and greenfield entry strategies when organizational internal isomorphic 
pressures are higher.  
Internal pressures are greater when foreign entry decisions involve the 
MNEs' core businesses than when such decisions involve only peripheral, non-
core, activities. The core business holds resources and capabilities, namely 
knowledge-based and experiential capabilities, which have the greatest value. 
Most of the MNE's revenue is also likely to come from the core business. In 
addition, the values, mission, and strategic objectives of the firm are probably 
based on the core business. For example, for an automaker, the core business 
may not be the actual manufacture of many components, but rather the 
assembly, branding and distribution of automobiles. Automakers can then 
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outsource the design, much of the R&D, and the manufacture of, for example, 
plastic components.  
DiMaggio and Powell (1991) and Powell (1991) argued that internal 
institutional pressures are most likely to generate suboptimal decisions when 
investments in current resources represent cognitive sunk costs. Examples of 
cognitive sunk costs include employees' fears about learning new skills, firms' 
divergence from pre-set missions/visions, top executives' unwillingness to 
betray corporate traditions, etc. Cognitive sunk costs are associated with 
social and psychological costs. Therefore, we expect internal institutional 
pressures to be lower when foreign entry decisions are not essential to the 
MNE's core businesses. In non-core activities the degree of experimentation, 
or exploration (March, 1991), may be higher, without causing substantial 
attrition of established cognitive and normative practices. 
Proposition 4b. MNEs' foreign market entry strategies will be more likely to 
depart from previously employed entry strategies when the subsidiaries' 
activity does not represent the core business of the MNE.  
Moderating Effects  
In this section, we propose two moderating effects of MNEs' 
international experience and technological strategies associated with the 
industry. These two factors seem to carry the most weight on firms' strategic 
adaptation to a multidimensional institutional environment. 
MNEs’ international experience. MNEs learn from their international 
experience. The evolutionary perspective of internationalization developed by 
the Uppsala school (e.g., Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Johanson & Wiedershiem-
Paul, 1975) suggests that prior experiences accumulated from previous 
market entries influence future foreign entries. Following this literature, and 
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prior work on the impact of the institutional environment on MNEs' strategies 
(e.g., Xu & Shenkar, 2002), we suggest that prior learning carries over to 
subsequent entries and that MNEs’ entry strategies reflect expectations 
originating from prior experiences. International experience becomes salient 
when MNEs with operations in multiple markets develop a general structural 
ability to adapt (Tallman & Fladmoe-Lindquist, 2002), even when they 
encounter relatively unfamiliar territory. International experience may reduce 
the risks and uncertainties perceived during international expansion because 
MNEs learn how to manage new foreign entries. The likelihood of the new 
entry's survival increases as the subsidiary learns local routines, norms, and 
structures, and absorbs, through experience, the uncertainties of external 
environments. In summary, through experiential learning MNEs internalize at 
least some of the external uncertainties in the subsidiary's routines and 
processes (Nelson & Winter, 1982). 
In the initial stage of market entry, both experience and knowledge of 
host country institutions are low, supporting Johanson and Vahlne’s (1977) 
proposition that an export entry strategy is more likely for low levels of 
experiential knowledge because exporting entails lower risks. This includes 
lower risks of unintended diffusion of proprietary knowledge, lower risks of 
selecting an inadequate partner, or lower risks from failing to abide by the 
host's norms and regulations. However, the likelihood of failure of the new 
foreign subsidiary decreases as it becomes progressively more embedded, 
aware, and knowledgeable of the surrounding host institutional environment. 
MNEs with more extensive international experience may more easily leverage 
their resource-based or knowledge-based capabilities to further their 
internationalization (Tallman & Fladmoe-Lindquist, 2002). More internationally 
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experienced MNEs will be more likely to replicate their home activities in the 
host country through greenfield startups. Thus, the extent to which the MNE is 
internationally experienced will determine future entry strategy selections 
(Henisz, 2003). We suggest a moderating effect of MNEs' international 
experience on the selection of the entry strategy. 
Proposition 5a.  MNEs' international experience negatively moderates the 
relationships between the level of institutionalization of the host market and 
the MNEs' entry strategy; such that, MNEs with more international experience 
are more likely to select greenfield entry strategies than MNEs with less 
international experience. 
MNEs with low levels of international experience are likely to prefer low 
commitment entry strategies in an host country (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; 
Luostarinen & Welch, 1990), but they may also engage in high commitment 
strategies, such as acquisitions or greenfield startup investments. 
Interestingly, these three very dissimilar choices entail reducing the risks 
involved in foreign entry and exploiting the firms' existing capabilities. First, 
export entries require a lower commitment of resources and less assumption 
of business and country risks. Second, entries through acquisition involve the 
acquisition of an incumbent and already legitimized firm. Third, greenfield 
entries rely on exploitation of the MNEs' already existing resources and 
capabilities and presumably what they know how to do best. Acquisitions, 
despite the well-known potential post-integration hazards (e.g., Harzing, 
2002) are likely to reduce some forms of risk, even in the absence of 
international experience. At low levels of international experience the acquirer 
will seek those local firms that seem better embedded in the market. For high 
levels of international experience the acquirer is better able to evaluate target 
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firms (Reuer & Ragozzino, 2004). Similarly for greenfield startup foreign 
investments, the focal MNEs will use their knowledge gained from international 
experience, thus lowering the risks involved. Conversely, for intermediate 
levels of international experience the focal MNE is likely to seek partners, both 
local and foreign, to learn new businesses and new markets. Hence, we assert 
that one of the facets of MNEs' international experience is that it reduces the 
importance of host country differences (i.e., institutional distance). In sum, 
MNEs' international experience partly offsets the institutional distance between 
home and host countries. 
Proposition 5b.  MNEs' international experience offsets barriers imposed by 
institutional distance between home and host countries on MNEs' entry 
strategy such that for both low and high levels of international experience, 
MNEs are more likely to select either greenfield or acquisition entry strategies 
than MNEs with intermediate levels of international experience. 
MNEs’ technological strategy. MNEs' technological strategy also 
moderates the relationships between internal institutional environment and 
entry strategy. Here we consider two different technological learning 
strategies: exploitation and exploration (March, 1991).  First, when the 
objective of an MNE is to obtain and transfer knowledge from the host market, 
the MNE pursues exploration strategies and selects entry modes that facilitate 
absorbing host country knowledge (see Kogut, 1991; Porter, 1990; Dunning, 
1998). For instance, the acquisition of an incumbent firm provides better 
chances to explore and acquire technology and knowledge available in the 
host market. A growing stream of IB research notes that firms internationalize 
to absorb and develop knowledge from foreign locations (Johanson & Vahlne, 
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1977, 1990; Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1998; Porter, 1998; Birkinshaw & Hood, 
1998; Kogut & Zander, 1993).   
Second, we also can imagine an MNE which possesses its own knowledge 
and technology to exploit in a host market (Hymer, 1976). Especially when 
host market institutions are not reliable in protecting this knowledge (e.g., 
patents and proprietary rights poorly protected) from a potential opportunistic 
partner, joint ventures or alliances become less feasible foreign entry 
strategies (Teece, 1986). When local institutions do not protect the owner of 
the knowledge from opportunistic partners, the MNE tends to keep the 
knowledge internalized and expands through greenfield entries, as existing 
research suggests.  
MNEs pursuing technological exploitation (March, 1991) strategies are 
generally knowledge intensive and base their relative competitive advantage in 
a set of valuable resources (Barney, 1991; March, 1991) that require 
integration across subsidiaries (Kogut & Zander, 1993; Birkinshaw & Hood, 
1998). Inter-subsidiary technology integration increases the complexity of 
internal relations and the need for coordination by headquarters (Bartlett & 
Ghoshal, 1998), possibly in a hub-and-spoke model. Thus, pursuing inter-
subsidiary technology integration pushes subsidiaries to adopt strategies 
leading to parental mimetic isomorphism, and to select equity entry strategies 
maintaining internalized firm-specific technological advantages.  
Proposition 6.  MNEs' technological strategies moderate the relationship 
between MNE internal institutional environments and entry strategies; that is, 
MNEs pursuing international technology exploitation are more likely to select 
greenfield entry strategies over alternative strategies than MNEs pursuing 
international technology exploration. 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
MNEs select foreign entry strategies that better fit the various facets of 
current external, internal, and inter-firm institutional contexts. In this paper, 
we develop a series of propositions to capture the impact of these contexts on 
MNEs' foreign entry strategies. We suggest a more comprehensive model of 
how MNEs select their foreign entry strategies and highlight the complexity of 
entry strategies as a multidimensional strategic choice. We advance several 
factors that affect foreign entry strategies, including host country 
institutionalization, asymmetric institutional distance between home and host 
countries, inter-firm interfaces, and internal institutional pressures. Moreover, 
by integrating MNEs' international experience, we support the perspective that 
entry strategies are not totally discrete events, sustaining one of the most 
commonly advocated advantages of MNEs: their ability to leverage dispersed 
assets to overcome local firms' superior knowledge of the host market 
(Hymer, 1976; Kogut & Zander, 1993). In addition, MNEs' strategic choices 
are influenced by institutional pressures operating at a worldwide level (e.g., 
the push toward quality standards, the utilization of consulting and 
management firms). Conceptualizing MNEs as learning entities that are 
capable of strategic adaptation to environments where they operate, it seems 
reasonable to suggest that the more internationally experienced MNEs 
progressively learn to distinguish institutional pressures to which they need to 
adapt from those they do not. For instance, internationally experienced MNEs 
are more able to develop locally optimal foreign entry strategies that buffer 
them from large external misfits. Future research may examine whether this 
results in the utilization of a uniform script in every foreign entry or in the use 
of profoundly distinct scripts that are absolutely tailored to each foreign entry.  
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We further expanded traditional research on the impact of the 
institutional environment on inter-firm interfaces. In fact, firms' actions occur 
neither in isolation nor are they driven solely by an "undefined" external 
environment. In our analysis of home-host country institutional distance, we 
suggest that the direction of the distance (from more institutionally developed 
to less institutionally developed countries, for example) may be more relevant 
than measures of absolute differences between countries for MNEs’ strategies. 
Finally, we argued that when entering unfamiliar environments the selection of 
the object, or strategy, to imitate may be far from trivial because appropriate 
referents do not necessarily exist, contrary to what the extant literature 
seemingly suggests. For example, the identification of a referent firm may be 
a hazardous task for entries into transition and emerging economies, new 
technological areas, newly opened markets, and so forth. 
We aimed to construct a more comprehensive model of the impact of 
various facets of the institutional environment on entry strategies. 
Nevertheless, we do not argue that this is the complete model. Future 
research may pursue additional factors exerting main or moderating effects on 
MNEs' selection of foreign entry strategies, as well as disentangle interactions 
among these factors. For example, it is likely that institutional pressures vary 
across industries (Henisz, 2003). Strategic industries such as the military, or 
industries upon which the government imposes legal or ownership boundaries 
(e.g., transportation, telecommunications, energy, education, and medicare), 
are more likely to be subject to a higher need to adapt to host institutional 
requirements. In these cases, foreign entry strategies may require local 
physical presence and direct investment in host country facilities. 
Furthermore, direct investment in local facilities may override social pressures 
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such as unfavorable public opinion towards foreign firms, concerns with local 
development and employment, and a host nationalist political culture.  
Future Research 
Future research may explore how MNEs' structures change over time 
(i.e., with accumulated international experience) in response to changing 
institutional pressures. However, the most important step now is to 
complement conceptual explorations with empirical quantifications of the 
degree of institutionalization of host markets. The extant research is lacking 
concrete measures of institutionalization, in the absence of which it is not 
surprising that studies of mimicking behaviors predominate (Haveman, 1993). 
Future research may also examine how organizational decisions are 
value-laden choices constrained by the power dynamics and social context of 
decision making. Top managers commonly make non-rational choices bounded 
by social judgment, historical limitations, and the inertial force of habit 
(Simon, 1947). As Ginsberg (1994) observed, strong internal institutional 
pressures may dominate in the evaluation of current resource allocations and 
may hinder any changes in the current pattern of resource deployments. 
Therefore, MNEs' entry strategies should not violate the core values of the 
MNEs and need to gain support from top managers. However, there is a 
notable scarcity of studies on how internal politics and power balances among 
divisions and top management affect the selection of a foreign entry strategy.   
Finally, while we use the insights of institutional theory, future 
contributions may be balanced with other theoretical strands. For example, 
Kogut and Singh (1988: 412) argue that transaction cost explanations of entry 
strategy selection "must be qualified by factors stemming from the 
institutional and cultural context." Transaction costs theory (Williamson, 1985) 
 - 29 - 
suggests that whenever the transaction costs of organizing internally are lower 
than the cost of exchanging in the market, the MNE attempts to enter foreign 
markets through equity strategies. We note, however, that reducing the 
transaction costs favors economic rationality and efficiency, but may 
undermine internal conformity and host legitimacy, paradoxically increasing 
the subsidiary's likelihood of failure.  
We build our propositions in a generalization of what should be ceteris 
paribus clauses, because different external institutional pressures are likely to 
differentially impact MNEs' strategies. Oliver (1991: 167) noted that "the more 
institutional pressures are entrenched in a legal or regulatory apparatus, the 
less likely it is that organizations will resist these pressures". Hence, while 
multiple facets of the internal and external institutional environment should be 
considered, some of the facets seem to carry more weight than others. We 
may also expect organizations to conform easily to external pressures if those 
pressures are compatible with internal objectives and efficiency criteria.  
To conclude, the various facets of institutional environment have a 
significant impact on firms' foreign entry strategies. Institutional theory is 
valuable in evaluating parent-subsidiary relationships and MNEs' local 
responsiveness. These are pillars of MNEs' international strategies. 
Notwithstanding, studies on entry strategies have often overlooked 
institutional factors and pressures (Davis et al., 2000; Xu & Shenkar, 2002). 
Using institutional theory we argue that entry strategy is not always a result of 
planned strategy or an attempt to achieve the most efficient outcome. For 
example, while foreign entries through both greenfield startup investments 
and through exports may be favored when local institutional pressures are 
low, high resource commitment entry strategies may absorb local uncertainty 
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and enhance legitimacy in the host country. The adoption of intermediate, or 
hybrid, strategies such as equity joint ventures and strategic alliances may be 
dependent on the level of institutional development of the host country and on 
the headquarters' strategy. MNEs' strategies are influenced, but not absolutely 
determined by, the external environment in which they operate, and the 
institutional pressures do not necessarily supersede a choice among 
alternative strategies. 
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FIGURE 1. General Model of the Interaction between  
the MNE and Its Environments 
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FIGURE 2. Conceptual Model 
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